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THE EXCLUDABILITY OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AFTER
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BURKE
by
RAY A. KNIGHT*
LEE G. KNIGHT*
WAYNE NIDCXo
INTRODUCTION
The scope of the personal injury exclusion under Internal Revenue Code § 104(a)(2)
has been significantly broadened since the mid- 1980's as the result of numerous court
decisions in the areas of reputation and discrimination injuries.' In our increasingly
litigious society, more tax cases contesting the excludability of damages recoveries are
expected. In United States v. Burke, decided May 26,1992, the Supreme Court resolved
an important issue regarding excludability from federal taxation of damages received in
discrimination cases.2 Unfortunately, the case was decided on narrow grounds, which
may only add to, rather than reduce, the conflict among the lower courts.' Burke, which
involves the exclusionof recoveries underTitle VII forsex discrinination, isdiscussedbelow?
Tax professionals need to be aware of the tax implications of personal injury recov-
eries inorderto help clients and clients' legal advisors plan strategy prior to the initiation
of actions for damage recoveries and to properly report amounts received. This article
reviews Burke and other recent developments in the areas of (1) taxation of recoveries
for injury to reputation, (2) taxation of recoveries for discrimination, and (3) taxation of
punitive damages received in personal injury suits. This article concludes with a discus-
sion of tax planning implications of these issues and new developments.
Section 61 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "gross income means all
income from whatever source derived. "5 An exception to the all inclusive rule of § 61 (a)
is found in § 104(a)(2), which excludes "the amount of any damages received (whether
by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of
personal injuries or sickness."6 Amendments to § 104(a)(2) by the 1989 Revenue Reconcili-
ationAct (RRA) relatingto the tieatment of'purutive damages are discussed laterin this article.
" Ray A. Knight, LD., C.P.A., Professor of Accounting, Middle Tennessee State University.
Lee G. Knight, Ph.D., Professor of Accounting, Middle Tennessee State University.
Wayne Nix, J.D., C.P.A., Assistant Professor of Accounting, University of Alabama-Huntsville.
See United States v. Burke, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 1871 n.6 (1992).
2 See id. at 1868.
3 Id. at 1874.
4 Id. at 1868.
3 I.R.C. § 61(a) (1992).
6 LR.C. § 104(a)(2) (1992).
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Treatment of Damages for Injury to Reputation
Damages forinjury to reputationhave beenheld to be excludable under § 104(a)(2).'
However, it is the position of the IRS that damages awarded for injury to the taxpayer's
business or professional reputation ae not based on personal injury and therefore are not
excludable under § 104(a)(2). Three cases, Roemer v. Commissioner,9 Threlkeld v.
Commissioner,0 and Miller v. Commissioner, I illustrate the positions of the IRS and the
courts regarding exclusion of damages for injury to business or professional reputation.
In Roemer, the taxpayer sought to exclude under § 104(a)(2) an award of compen-
satory and punitive damages for injury to his personal and business reputation.'2 Roemer
requested a credit report in connection with an application for an agency license with an
insurance company.13 The credit agency issued a defamatory report which questioned
Roemer's honesty and the integrity of his business dealings.14 Roemer was denied the
agency license that he sought and suffered harm to his reputation in the community.I1
Roemer then brought an action forlibel underthe California Civil Code and was awarded
compensatory damages of $40,000 and punitive damages of $250,000. 16 The award did
not allocate damages according to Roemer's personal injury orhis economic losses. 7 In
his complaint, Roemer emphasized the damage to his business relationships. 8 The IRS
argued that the damages were awarded primarily to compensate the taxpayer for lost
income and, therefore, compensated him for damages to his business and professional
reputation rather than his personal reputation.' 9 The IRS concluded that these damages
were not due to personal injuries and were not excludable under § 104(a)(2).' The Tax
Court held that a distinction should be made between injury to personal reputation and
injury to business or professional reputation because the latter are not excludable under
§ 104(a)(2).' The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and held that the damages received
by Roemer were primarily for injury to his business and professional reputation and
7 See Burke, 112S. CL at 1871 n.6.
' See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983),
9 Id.
IS Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
" Miller v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
12 Roemer, 716 E2d at 695.
11 Id. at 694-95.
14 Id. at 695.
13 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
Is Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 406-07.
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were not on account of personal injury.? Because the damages were not on account of
a personal injury, the Tax Court decided that the § 104(aX2) exclusion was not available.2
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision inRoemer and refused
to draw a distinction between injury to personal reputation and injury to professional
reputation for purposes of § 104(a)(2).2 The Ninth Circuit held that the nature of the tort
of defamation, as defined by state law, must be examined to determine whether the
injuries ae personal.25 The court stated that if defamation is a personal injury, then
compensatory damages flowing therefrom, including economic damages, are exclud-
able.' In addressing these points, the court stated:
... all defamatory statements attack an individual's good name. This injury
to the person should not be confused with the derivative consequences of
the defamatory attack, i.e., the loss of reputation in the community and any
loss of income. The nonpersonal consequences of personal injury, such as
a loss of future income, are often the most persuasive means of proving the
extent of the injury that was suffered. The personal nature of an injury
should not be defined by its effect.27
The Ninth Circuit found that defamation of an individual is a personal injury under
California state law.28 Thus, the taxpayer's damages were recovered on account of
personal injury and were excludable under § 104(a)(2). 29
In 1986 the Tax Court reversed its position inRoemer and adopted the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Roemer.3 This reversal occurred in Threlkeld v. Commissioner where the
taxpayer sought to exclude a settlement recovery for malicious prosecution." Threlkeld
settled an action for malicious prosecution and recovered damages of $300,000, includ-
ing $75,000 specifically allocated to damages for injury to professional reputation.? The
IRS argued that damages resulting from injury to the taxpayer's professional reputation
were taxable." However, the Tax Court agreed that no distinction should be drawn
2 Id. at 406.
Id. at407.
Roemer, 716 F.2d 693,700-01 (9th Cir. 1983).
25 Id. at 697.
2 Id.
27 Id. at 699.
" Id. at 700.
2 Id.
3 See Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1988).
31 Id.
3 Id. at 82.
33 Id.
1993]
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between injury to personal reputation and injury to professional reputation.34 After
considering the nature of the claim and state law characterization of an action for ma-
licious prosecution, the Tax Court determined that the damages were received on ac-
count of personal injuies.35 The fact that a portion of the damages was specifically
allocated to injury to professional reputation was not relevant in the decision.36 The Tax
Court reviewed all of the facts and circumstances, not simply state law, to determine
whether the injury was personal." Threlkeld was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit which
adopted the reasoning in Roemer.38
In 1989 the Tax Court had an opportunity to reconsider its position in Threlkeld.39
In Miller v. Commissioner, the taxpayer received a settlement for damages resulting
from defamation.4 The taxpayer had been accused of embezzlement by her employer
and had been fired.41 The taxpayer prevailed in a suit for damages against her employer
and subsequently settled for an amount which was not allocated between compensatory
and punitive damages.42 The IRS stated that the settlement proceeds represented a
recovery fordamage to professional reputation and, thus, were notexcludable from gross
income.43 As in Threlkeld, the Tax Court refused to "draw a distinction between damage
to personal reputation and damage to professional reputation." The Tax Court held that
under Maryland state law, an action for defamation was personal in nature.4 Thus, all
damages, compensatory and punitive, received on account of defamation were exclud-
able under§ 104(a)(2).46 On appeal the Fourth Circuit overruled the Tax Court regarding
the punitive damages.47 A discussion of punitive damages appears later in this article.
The IRS did not appeal the Tax Court's holding regarding the compensatory damages.
Roemer, Threlkeld, and Miller illustrate the position of the IRS in defamation ac-
tions in which damages flowing therefrom can be related to the taxpayer's income,
business, profession, or employment. Recently the IRS has not been successful in
arguing that economic losses recovered in defamation suits are not excludable. How-
ever, the IRS has not changed its position. The exclusion of economic damages is a
prominent issue in the discrimination cases analyzed next.
-u Id.
ss Id.
SThrelkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294,1307 (1986), affid, 848 F.2d 81 (6th.Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1308.
" Threlkd, 848 F.2d at 84.
See Miller v. Commissioner. 93 T.C. 330, 337 (1989). rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
4 Id. at 333-34.
41 Id. at 331-32.
42 Id. at 333-34.
,sId. at 335.
Id. at 337.
4sId. at 335.
I ld. at 337-41.
4 Miller, 914 F2d 586 592 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'g 93 T.C. 330 (1989).
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Treatment of Discrimination Recoveries
The scope of excludable damages under § 104(a)(2) includes damages based upon
common law torts such as libel, slander, malicious prosecution, wrongful death, etc., and
damages based upon "tort-type" rights." The regulations do not define tort-type rights.
Courts have held that recoveries based upon age, sex, and race discrimination are within
the scope of § 104(a)(2).
1. Sex Discrimination
In United States v. Burke numerous plaintiffs received settlements for back wages
due to sex discrimination.49 Burke and other employees of the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity (TVA) filed a lawsuit against the TVA underTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
for discrimination in pay against female employees ° The case was settled and the TVA
agreed to distribute $5,000,000, net of income and FICA taxes, to the affected employ-
ees." The payment to each employee was based on length of service and rate of pay for
the period of discrimination. 52 The settlement agreement provided forno payments other
than back pay.5
The District Court found that all payments were in lieu ofback pay and held that such
payments were not damages on account of personal injury and were not excludable
under § 104(a)(2).-5 The Sixth Circuit Court overruled the District Court in Burke and
held that all payments for back pay received in the sex discrimination action were
excludable. 55 The court held that the appropriate test for determining excludability was
the nature of the injury rather than the derivative consequences of the injury such as loss
of wages.m Once the court determined that sex discrimination was a tort-like injury, the
excludability issue was settled.57
The IRS appealed Burke to the Supreme Court, which decided the case in May 1992.
Burke was decided on narrow grounds and may have limited applicability. Since recent
amendments to Title VII are significant in Burke, these amendments are briefly discussed.
- LR.C. § 104(a)(2) (1992).
9 United States v. Burke, 112 S. CL 1867, 1869 (1992).
I ld. at 1868-69.
sI Id. at 1869.
5 Id.
s Id.
s Id.
ss Id. at 1869-0.
United Stares v. Burke, 929 F2d 1119, 1121 (6th Cir. 1990), revd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
Id.
' Burke, 112 S. C. at 1867.
19931
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Priorto the enactment ofthe CivilRightsActof 1991 (CRA 1991) the only monetary
remedy underTitle VII was back pay. Title VII did not provide for payment of compen-
satory or punitive damages for other injuries such as pain and suffering, emotional
distress, or harm to reputation.59 CRA 1991 amended Title VII to allow victims of
intentional discrimination to receive awards for compensatory and punitive damages.60
By enacting these amendments Congress sought to compensate victims for injury to
"their careers, mental and emotional health, and to their self-respect and dignity."61 Title
VII as amended by CRA 1991 provides for payment of compensatory and punitive
damages which have traditionally been associated with torts, in addition to back pay.'
Title VII, prior to amendment by CRA 1991, is referred to below as the "pre- 1991 Title
VII," while Title VII, as amended by the CRA 1991, is referred to as "amended Title VIL"
The Supreme Court in Burke examined the nature of the remedies afforded by Title
VII to victims of sex discrimination in order to determine if the payment of back pay fell
within the exclusion of damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness.63
The Court stated "... we believe that consideration ofthe remedies available underTitle
VII is critical in determining the 'nature of the statute' and the 'type of claim' brought
by respondents for purposes of [§] 104(a)(2)." The Court agreed that discrimination
on the basis of sex could be an invasion of an individual right that is properly classified
as a tort." The Court stated: "no doubt discrimination could constitute a 'personal injury'
forpurposes of § 104(a)(2)iftherelevantcause of actionevidenced a tort-like conception
of injury and remedy."" The Court then looked at the remedies provided by Title VII
to determine whether Title VII "redresses a tort-like personal injury."67 The Court
concluded that pre-1991 Title VII did not redress a tort-like personal injury because it
did not provide for compensatory or punitive damages traditionally allowed under tort
law." The Court emphasized that Title VII's "sole remedial focus" on back pay was
insufficient to bring it within the scope of traditional tort damages.Y
Id. at 1874 n.12.
Id.
I d.
I d.
See id. at 1872.
Id. at 1872 n.7.
Is d. at 18713.
Id.
67ld. at 1874.
I d.
Id.
[Vol. 10
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Does the ruling in Burke have implications for other discrimination cases or is it a
narrow ruling with implications only for awards granted under the pre-1991 Title VII?
The Burke Court stated
... we believe that Congress' decision to permit jury trials and compensa-
tory and punitive damages under the amended act signals a marked change
in its conception of the injury redressable by Title VII, and cannot be
imported back into the analysis of the statute as it existed at the time of this
lawsuit.70
Would the Court's ruling have been different if Burke had recovered under amendedTitle
VII? The above quotation suggests that adifferent resultmightbe reached underamended
Title VII. The Court suggests that the "marked change in the conception of the injury"
transforms amended Title VII into a tort-like remedy.71
However, the possibility exists that the Supreme Court might treat recoveries under
the amended Title VII as follows: (1) back pay claims might be viewed as contractual
in nature and thus not excludable, while (2) compensatory damages might be held
excludable as tort-like damages. Footnote thirteen in Burke suggests the above di-
chotomy.72 The Court stated that "Our holding that damages received in settlement of
a Title VII award are not properly excludable under § 104(a)(2) finds support in
longstanding rulings of the IRS,' ' citing Revenue Ruling 72-341.14 In RR 72-341 the
IRS ruled thatpayments received by employees of acorporation as a result ofa suit under
Title VII are compensation and are includable in gross income. 5 The above comments
are obviously speculatory because they are based on dicta. The Supreme Court Was not
faced with the issue of excludability of awards under amended Title VII and, based on
long standing tradition, chose not to address that issue.76
In Metzger v. Commissioner, decided in 1987, the Tax Court considered the exclud-
ability of a recovery for sex discrimination based on Title VII and several other causes
of action.77 Metzger sued her college employer when she was denied tenure. 8 Several
suits were filed based on claims of breach of contract and discrimination on account of
sex and national origin.79 An agreement was reached in which Metzger accepted $75,000
70 Id. at 1874 n.12.
71 Id.
72 Seeid. at1874n.13.
73 Id.
74 Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32.
75 Id.
76 Burke, 112 S.Ct. at 1872 n.8.
Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834 (1987), afftd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
7 Id. at 838.
7 Id. at 839-40.
1993]
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in settlement of all claims.80 The settlement stated that $37,500 was in settlementof wage
claims and $37,500 was in settlement of all other claims, which included damages for
personal injuries, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.8 Metzger reported the wage
claim settlement as gross income and claimed an exclusion for the $37,500 paid in
settlement of all other claims.8 The IRS argued that the entire settlement was includable
in gross income.83
The Tax Court reviewed several claims brought by Metzger including claims (1)
under42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985, and 1986; (2) underthe thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and (3) under similar state statutes." The Tax
Court reviewed several cases which described the above actions as (1) personal injury
actions (2) resulting in tort liability (3) for which damages ae allowable and (4) which
are subject to personal injury statutes of limitations.8 The court concluded that most of
Metzger's claims were for personal injuries based on tort claims rather than for back
pay. N The court held that at least $37,500 of the recovery was excludable and suggested
that a greater exclusion would have been allowed had Metzger sought to exclude more
than $37,500.1 However, the Tax Court affirmed its prior holding in Hodge that a
recovery under Title VII, solely for back pay, is not excludable.8
Metzger provides the following important rulings which may be applicable after
Burke: (1) where discrimination claims are based solely on Title VII and calculated
solely on the basis of back pay, the recovery is not excludable, and (2) where other causes
of action for discrimination are raised which provide for damage remedies, recoveries
ae excludable even if based in part on lost earnings.89 This result would follow when
lost earnings serve as evidence of the amount of the injury rather than an independent
basis for recovery under the cause of action. Metzger was affirmed by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals without a published opinion.90
An additional issue of interest was raised in Metzger concerning the validity of a
claim or cause of action.9 The IRS argued that none of the damages could be personal
Id. at 842.
*1 Id.
" Id. at 845.
I3 d. at 846.
" Id. at 845.
I d. at 847-58.
Id. at 858.
7 1d.
0 Id. See also Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616 (1975).
09 See Metzger, 88 T.C. at 834.
90 Metzger v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 1013 (3rd Cir. 1988).
91 Metzger, 88 T.C. at 851-52.
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since the statute of limitations on a personal injury case ran before Metzger filed suit.92
The Tax Court held that, even if the statute of limitations had rn, the nature of the claim,
not the validity, determined excludability under § 104(a)(2).93
In Thompson v. Commissioner the taxpayer received back pay and liquidated dam-
ages in a sex discrimination suit brought under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII.9
As a general rule, the EPA prohibits discrimination based upon sex with respect to
compensation for equal work.9s The EPA provides for payment of (1) back pay and (2)
liquidated damages equal to the back payY6 Liquidated damages can be avoided by an
employer upon a showing of good faith.9 Employees cannot obtain a double recovery
under both the EPA and Title VII for back pay.98 The Tax Court held that damages for
back pay under the EPA were received on account of a contract-type claim and were not
excludable under § 104(a)(2). 99 Then, the court analyzed the nature of liquidated dam-
ages and found that the fact that liquidated damages were paid provides evidence that
the employer did not act in good faith and that Thompson was personally injured. 00
Therefore, the liquidated damages were received on account of the sex discrimination
claim and were excludable. 101
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit accepted the reasoning of the Tax CourtL0 2 The court
held that ". . . sex discrimination actions in general are tort or tort-type actions and
damages awarded for violation of that right are damages for personal injuries."'' 3 The
court then looked at the elements of the recovery and the nature of each claim to deter-
mine the tax consequences."0' The court found that back pay was essentially an award
for a contract violation whereas liquidated damages were awarded to compensate the
employee for obscure damages difficult to measure.lW Based upon the nature of the
awards, the Circuit Court held that: (1) back pay was not excludable and (2) liquidated
damages were excludable as damages received on account of a personal injury.' '
92 See id. at 852-55.
" Id. at 858.
9 Thompsonv. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709-710 (4th Cir. 1989).
s See id. at 711.
Jd. at 711-12.
9 Id. at 712.
Id. at 711-12.
Id. at 712.
Thompson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 632 (1987), aft'd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
I0 d. at 650.
IU Thompson, 866 F.2d at 712.
103 Id.
104 Id.
i's Id.
106 Id.
1993]
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As suggested in the discussion of Burke earlier, the above contract/tort dichotomy
may be applied in sex discrimination cases after Burke. This dichotomy is an important
issue in the following discussion of age discrimination cases.
2. Age Discrimination
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits discrimination in
hiring, promotion, and termination on account of age and applies to employees between
the ages of forty and seventy."7 Remedies provided by the ADEA include: (1) recovery
of back pay, (2) recovery of liquidated damages equal to back pay where violations by
the employer are willful, and (3) other equitable relief including reinstatement, promo-
tion, or hiring.108
The first case before the Tax Court to contest the excludability of age discrimination
recoveries was Rickelv. Commissioner.'09 Rickel was sales manager for MM Company,
whose president told him that someone younger was wanted for the sales manager's
position. 10 Shortly thereafter Rickel was removed from his position, his pay was re-
duced, and later, he was discharged."' Rickel brought suit under the ADEA against his
former employer for unlawful discharge.12 In his complaint he requested back pay,
liquidated damages equal to back pay, attomey fees, and reinstatement" 3 A settlement
was reached which did not allocate the monetary recovery to either back pay, liquidated
damages, or attorney fees." 4 The Tax Court reviewed the ADEA and determined that
it provided for recoveries based on contract and tort claims."' The Tax Court held (1)
that wage-related claims were based on breach of contract elements and were not exclud-
able from gross income, and (2) that liquidated damages were intended to compensate
the plaintiff for hard to measure damages resulting from a tort-type injury and were
therefore, excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2)." 6 Since theADEAprovides
for liquidated damages equal to back pay, the Tax Court held that the recovery should
be allocated equally between liquidated damages and back pay."'
In Wirtz v. Commissioner the taxpayer filed several age discrimination suits under
the ADEA and requested that the District Court award back pay, liquidated damages, and
' See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1) (1992) (prohibitions); 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1992) (age).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1992).
10 Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510 (1989), afld in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
no Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
I11 [d.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 657.
114 Id.
,S Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510, 522 (1989), affd in pat, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
116 Id.
117 Id.
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reinstatement"8 No liquidated damages were awarded because the District Court found
that the employer violations were not willful.119 Back pay was awarded as well as front
pay in lieu of reinstatement.'20 The Tax Court held that neither of the recoveries were
intended to compensate the plaintiff for tort-type claims and that both recoveries were
in lieu of lost wages.' 2' Following Rickel, the Tax Court held that the recoveries were
not excludable?2
In Pistillo v. Commissioner the taxpayer brought an age discrimination suit under
the ADEA and was awarded compensatory (wage-related) damages by the jury.11 No
liquidated damages were awarded.'U A subsequently entered settlement agreement did
not specify whether the payments received were intended to cover wage related claims
or liquidated damages.'2 The Tax Court cited Rickel with approval and held that "the
compensatory [wage-related] damage component is in the nature of a payment for a
contractual violation rather than a tort-type right." The court then held that the total
payment was includable in gross income."
Both Rickel and Pistillo were overruled in 1990 by the Third and Sixth Circuit
Courts, respectively.' 7 In Rickel the Third Circuit cited with approval Threlkeld and
Roemer which held that the focus of the exclusion inquiry should be the personal or
nonpersonal nature of the claim and not the derivative consequences of the defendant's
actions such as loss of income.'2 The court stated that"... once it [theTax Court] found
that age discrimination was analogous to a personal injury and that the taxpayer's ADEA
action amounted to a tort-type right, the Tax Court should have ended its analysis and
found that all damages flowing therefrom were excludable under § 104(a)(2)." 129 The
Circuit Court characterized an age discrimination claim as a tort-type right and held that
both the wage-related damages and the liquidated damages paid on account of such a
claim were excludable under § 104(a)(2).110 Similarly, in Pistillo the Sixth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court decision and he! d that the age discrimination suit was a tort-type
action and that the economic damages flowing therefrom (back pay) did not create a
11 Wirtz v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1596 (1989).
I' d.
I d.
m Id. at 1598.
I d.
m Pistillo v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 874, 875 (1989), rev'd, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
tI Jd. at 877.
IZ Id. at 879.
I d.
1 See Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F2d 655,656-57 (3rd Or. 1990); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 142,150
(6th Cir. 1990)..
m See Rickel, 900 F.2d at 661.
l9 Id.
130 Id. at 663-64.
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nonpersonal injury.'31 The Sixth Circuit employed the same reasoning used by the Third
Circuit in Rickel, and held that damages recovered by Pistillo were excludable under §104(a)(2). 13
Soon afterRickel and Pistillo were overruled, theTax Court had anotheropportunity
to reconsider its position regarding age discrimination recoveries. In Downey v. Com-
missioner decided in 1991, the Tax Court overruled its prior decisions in Rickel and
Pistillo.133 Downey, a pilot for United Airlines, was involuntarily retired by his employer
at age sixty."8 He filed an age discrmiiition suit under the ADEA and sought reinstate-
ment, back pay, and liquidated damages."3 The case was settled and Downey agreed to
drop all claims."8 The settlement agreement allocated $60,000 to non-liquidated (wage-
related) damages and $60,000 to liquidated damages. 137 The settlement agreement
provided that the $60,000 allocated to wage-related payments was subject to payroll
taxes and withholding." The IRS argued that wage-related payments were taxable
because they were paid in settlement of a claim for back pay rather than a claim for
personal injury. 39 The IRS also argued that liquidated damages under the ADEA are
intended to punish the employer and, thus, are taxable as punitive damages."14
The Tax Court reviewed the history of § 104(a)(2) and concluded that the focus of
the exclusion issue is the nature of the claim and whether the injury is personal, not the
consequences of the injury such as loss of income.141 Applying this principle, the Tax
Court found that age discrimination is a violation of a tort-type right and that damages
paid on account of age discrimination are excludable even thoughbased on lost wages. 42
The Tax Court also held that liquidated damages under the ADEA were intended by
Congress, and had been interpreted by the courts, as compensatory damages to the
plaintiff even though the employer viewed such damages as punitive. 14 3 Thus,
liquidated damages were paid "on account of' the personal injury suffered by Downey
and were excludable under § 104(a)(2).4 The situation in Keller v. Commissioner
1 Pistilo, 912 F.2d at 149-50.
m Id.at 150.
133 See Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150,168 (1991).
LM Id. at 153-54.
I' Id. at 154.
I3 Id. at 155.
137 Id.
138 Id.
I" Id. at 156.
140 Id. at 157.
"I Id. at 157-64.
I Id. at 169-70.
' I ld. at 173.
"4 Id.
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parallels the factual situation in Downey14s Keller sought to exclude back pay and
liquidated damages received under anADEAclaim. 146 TheTax Court refused to overrule
Downey and held that all of the damages received by Keller were excludable.'ia
In Redfield v. Insurance Co. ofNorthAmerica (ICNA), the Ninth Circuit Courtnoted
its agreement withPistillo and Rickel and held that "economic damages" received under
an ADEA claim were excludable under § 104(a)(2) and were not subject to federal
income tax withholding.'4 Redfield sued ICNAundertheADEAand other statutory and
tort actions. 49 The jury awarded an amount described as"economic damages."' ICNA
paid the judgment amount less federal and state income taxes and FICA taxes."'
In Redfield the Circuit Court was called on to determine whether ICNA properly
deducted state and federal taxes from the judgment amount 5 2 Redfield argued that the
judgment against ICNA was not satisfied until ICNA paid the full amount undiminished
by tax withholding.153 The Circuit Court noted that the Third Circuit in Rickel and the
Sixth Circuit in Pistillo had previously held that damages received underADEA claims
are excludable under § 104(a)(2).'" The Circuit Court found that the economic damages
received by Redfield arose from his ADEA claims. m The court agreed with the Third and
Sixth Circuits and held that recoveries under the ADEA are excludable under § 104(aX2).'L
Even though the IRS was not a litigant in Redfield, the case presents clearly the
position of the Ninth Circuit.57 Based on the Tax Court's decision in Downey and the
opinions oftheThird, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, there is a significant weight of authority
that all damages paid in age discrimination suits under the ADEA are excludable from
gross income.
3. Race Discrimination
In Sparrow v. Commissioner, the plaintiff sued the Navy for racial discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 Sparrow was terminated from his
14s Keller v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 401 (1991).
146 Id. at 402.
141 Id. at 403-04.
I" Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542, 548 (9th Cir. 1990).
9 Id. at 544.
Lv Id.
m Id.
m See id.
'm Id.
L" /d. at 545.
L1 Id. at 547.
L% Id.
" rd. at 549.1 Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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position as a computer systems analyst with the Navy in February 1977.151 He filed
complaints for reinstatement, back pay, and other relief with the EEOC which ordered
his reinstatement in January 1980.1 The Navy did not reinstate Sparrow, and Sparrow
filed suit in the District Cdurt for the District of Columbia in September 1982.61 A
settlement was reached which provided for payment of (1) $69,000 with respect to his
claim for reinstatement for the period of January 1980 through October 1982 and (2)
$23,000 for all other claims. 62 The settlement agreement referred to Sparrow's release
of all claims including any arising under Title VII. 63 The IRS argued that all of the
payments were wage related and were not excludable under § 104(a)(2).'6 This argu-
ment is consistent with the Service's position in the age and sex discrimination cases
discussed earlier. 6 Sparrow argued that the payments were damages forpersonal injury
resulting from racial discrimination rather than wage payments.'" The Tax Court held
that Sparrow was precluded from bringing a tort action for damages due to sovereign
immunity, and Sparrow, in fact, had no basis for suit against the U. S. government except
under Title VII.' 7 Title VII contains a provision which allows victims of covered
discrimination to bring suit against the federal govemment' Since Title VII only
provides for payment of wage-related damages and prohibits awards of compensatory
and punitive damages, the Tax Court held that none of the payments were excludable."
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the Tax Court's decision
in SparrowY7° The Circuit Court stated that two conditions must be met before an
exclusion is allowable "... (1) the amount received must be damages and (2) the amount
received as damages must result from a personal injury or sickness."' 7' The court did not
provide a definition of damages but stated: "the term 'damages' as used in § 104(a)(2)
embodies a monetary amount originally awarded at law, not in equity."'7 The court
analyzed the remedies of Title VII and concluded that back pay was an equitable rem-
edy-not a legal remedy. 73 Since the court decided that Sparrow had not recovered
damages, the issue of whether racial discrimination is a personal injury was moot. The
L9 Id. at 434.
'* Sparrow v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 816, 817 (1989).
I' d.
I" d. at 818.
'~Id.
"'Id.
"' See. eg.. United Staes v. Burke 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992); Metzger v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
See Sparrow, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) at 818.
t6 Id. at 819.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1992).
1 Sparrow, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) at 820.
Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 E2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
'7 Id. at 436.
172 Id. at 437.
173 Id. at 437-38.
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Circuit Court held that recovery of back pay under a Title VII claim was not excludable
under § 104(a)(2) because it did not constitute "damages.""7 4
In Stocks v. Commissioner, 15 the Tax Court held that racial discrimination is a tort-
like injury and that damages recovered on account of racial discrimination are exclud-
able.176 Stocks was a tenured professor at Sinclair Community College (College S).11
Officials at College S decided that Stocks' performance was unsatisfactory and they
would not extend her contract for the 1984-85 school year.78 The regulations of College
S required that a faculty member be given notice as of February first of the contract
period, if a contract for the next school year would not be extended.'" College S did not
give timely notice of its intention to terminate employment of Stocks.'1 Sometime after
August 1984 Stocks was informed that her contract would not be renewed for the 1984-
85 school year."' Stocks had previously filed racial discrimination charges against
College S with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the U.S. Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission.'8 Prior to the filing of any lawsuits, Stocks proposed a
settlement with College S which requested, among other actions, payment of salary and
fringe benefits for year 1984-85 and attorney fees.' A settlement agreement was
reached in November 1984 in which Stocks released all claims against College S and
accepted $24,000 in settlement.184 The settlement agreement did not specify the nature
of the settled claims.11 College S representatives testified that $24,000 was approxi-
mately the amount that would have been paid to Stocks for salary and fringe benefits for
year 1984-85.186 After reviewing the evidence the Tax Court found that two separate
claims had been settled: (1) a breach of contract claim for failing to offer a contract for
year 1984-85 and (2) a racial discrimination claim.19 Since the settlement agreement
made no allocation between the claims, the Tax Court was forced to do so and held that
$20,000 was received for breach of contract and $4000 was received on account of racial
discrimination.'I The Tax Court held that the amount received for breach of contract
17 Id. at 441.
a7 Stocks v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 1 (1992).
"7 Id. at 10.
I" Id. at 2.
176 Id. at 4-5.
1719 Id. at 5.
180 Id.
11 Id.
10 Id. at 3-4.
' Id. at 6.
1, Id. at 6-7.
12 Id.
I" Id. at 11-12.
19, Id. at 13.
1- Id. at 17.
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was not excludable.189 The court held that racial discrimination is a personal injury and
that damages received on account of racial discrimination are excludable 90
Treatment of Punitive Damages
Section 104(a)(2) provides for the exclusion of "any damages received... on
account of personal injuries or sickness." 191 However, both the IRS and the courts have
vacillated in their positions on the excludability of punitive damages. The current
position of the IRS is that all punitive damages ae taxable.
The 1989 RRA provided a partial victory for the IRS in the area of punitive damages
by amending § 104(a)(2) to provide that "Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive
damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury orphysical sickness."'9
The scant legislative history of the 1989 RRA does not provide any indication of Con-
gress' intent regarding the excludability of punitive damages in cases involving physical
injury. 93 It is reasonable to assume that Congress intended to exclude punitive damages
received in cases involving physical injury or sickness. This position has been rejected
by the IRS. Congress could have provided that the exclusion does not apply to punitive
damages regardless of the physical ornonphysical nature of the case. Whetheritisproper
to interpret Congressional intent based upon what Congress failed to do is debatable.
InRevenue Ruling 58-418, the taxpayer received a settlement in a libel suit for injury
to his personal reputation.'9 The recovery included both compensatory and punitive
damages. 95 The IRS ruled that the compensatory portion of the recovery was excludable
from gross income and the punitive portion was not excludable. 9 The ruling cited
Glenshaw Glass Co. as authority for including punitive damages in gross income." No
mention was made of either § 61 or § 104(a)(2). 19 In 1955, the Supreme Court held in
Glenshaw Glass Co. that punitive damages received in an action for violation of Federal
antitrust laws and fraud constituted gross income.199 However, Glenshaw involved the
issue of "includability" of punitive damages as part of gross income; exclusion as per-
1' Id.
I d.
19I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1992).
1 OmnibusReconciliationActof 1989,Pub. LNo. 101-239, §7641,103 StaL.2379,reprintedin 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(1989).
IS See H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989).
I- Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.
10 Id.
19 Id. at 19-20.
197 Id.at 19.
" Id. at 18-20.
t Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955).
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sonal injury damages was not at issue." Use of the principle announced in Glenshaw
in a personal injury exclusion context is misplaced.
In Revenue Ruling 75-45, the IRS stated that "any damages, whether compensatory
or punitive, received on account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable from
gross income."20' 1 The IRS cited the gross income exclusion in § 104(a)(2) and empha-
sized the words "any" and "on account of.'" Citing no other authorities, the IRS
concluded that punitive damages were excludable under § 104(a)(2).20 In Church v.
Commissioner, the Tax Court cited RR 75-45 with approval and held that both compen-
satory and punitive damages were received on account of personal injuries and were
excludable under § 104(a)(2).204 In Roemer, the Ninth Circuit also cited RR 75-45 with
approval and held that punitive damages, as well as compensatory damages, recovered
by the taxpayer were excludable under § 104(a)(2).
In Revenue Ruling 84-108, the IRS revoked RR 75-45 and held that punitive dam-
ages are includable in gross income.' RR 84-108 covers two factual situations.' In
the first situation, the decedent died as a result of an aircraft accident in his employer's
airplane.2 The employer's liability insurance policy provided for payments of certain
sums to the decedent's survivors in release of claims underthe decedent's state (Virginia)
Wrongful Death Act.20 Under the Virginia Wrongful Death Act, no punitive damages
were recoverable; only compensatory damages for actual losses of the survivors were
recoverable.210 In the second situation, the facts were the same except that the decedent's
residence was Alabama.21 The Alabama wrongful death act provided for recovery of
punitive damages only.212
The IRS stated that the treatment of damages received in settlement of a claim under
a wrongful death statute depended upon the characterization of the damages under
applicable state law.213 Damages received in the first situation (where the state Wrongful
Death Act provided for compensatory damages only) were excludable from gross in-
Id. at 427.
Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
2M Id.
20 Id.
Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1110 n.7 (1983).
20 Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693,700 (9th Cir. 1983).
"0 Rev. RuL. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32,34.
27 Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
210 Id.
21 Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 33.
212 Id.
213 1,
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come under § 104(a)(2).214 Damages received in the second situation (where the state
Wrongful Death Act provided for punitive damages only), on the other hand, were not
excludable under § 104(a)(2). 215
InRevenueRuling 85-98, the IRS restated the position adopted inRR 84-108.216 The
taxpayer's complaint asked for compensatory and punitive damages.27 The IRS ruled
that the actual damages received should be allocated between compensatory and puni-
tive in the same ratio as the amounts of compensatory and punitive damages asked for
in the complaint bore to the total damages.1 The IRS ruled that the compensatory
damages were excludable butthatpunitive damages werenotexcludableunder§ 104(aX2)P.9
At least one court has rejected the IRS's position on punitive damages espoused in
RR 84-108 and 85-98. InBurfordv. UnitedStates, a District Court inAlabama discussed
RR 84-108 because it was squarely on point with the facts at hand.2' The Alabama
Wrongful Death Act had been interpreted to provide exclusively for punitive damages,
and the IRS had ruled that a recovery of damages under the Alabama act was not
excludable under § 104(a)(2) because such recovery represented punitive damages.2'
The District Court rejected the IRS's ruling and held that a wrongful death action is a
personal action and that any damages received (whether compensatory or punitive) am
excludable.m
In Miller, the IRS argued that punitive damages received in settlement of a defama-
tion action were not excludable under § 104(a)(2).2 The situation in Miller involved
a non-physical injury (defamation) which occurred priorto the effective date ofthe RRA
of 1989 amendments to § 104(a)(2).2 The Tax Court interpreted the adjective "any"
preceding the word "damages" in § 104(a)(2) to mean "all."' ' The Tax Court noted that
the IRS had previously taken the position that punitive damages were excludable in RR
75-45.6 The Tax Court disagreed with the IRS's reversal of RR 75-45 and noted with
approval the district court decision in Burford.27
214 Id. at 34.
215 Id.
2-4 See Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51.
217 Id.
212 Id. at 52.
219 Id.
2 Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635, 637 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
= Id.
2n Id. at 638.
m Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586,587 (4th Cir. 1990).
See id.
"s Commissioner v. Miller, 93 T.C. 330,338 (1989), revd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
= Id. at 339.
zr d.
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On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the IRS conceded that the amendment to § 104(a)(2)
regarding punitive damages enacted by RRA 1989 did not apply to Miller.' Even so,
the IRS argued that punitive damages are not intended to compensate the plaintiff for
personal injury and result in a'windfall'to the plaintiffby pmviding a recovery in excess
of compensatory damages.29 It is clear that the IRS's position is that punitive damages
received in any personal injury (physical or nonphysical) are not excludable. The Fourth
Circuit noted that punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant rather than
compensate the plaintiff.m The court stated that punitive damages were not paid "on
account of' personal injury because something more than a personal injury is required
to warrant the awarding of punitive damages.23 The plaintiff must show malicious,
unjustifiable conduct by the defendant.m Following the judicially developed doctrine
of narrow construction of exclusions of income, the Circuit Court held that punitive
damages are not "compensation" for injuries and thus are not within the scope of the §
104(a)(2) exclusion.23
In Kemp v. Commissioner, a U.S. District Court held that punitive damages are not
excludable under § 104(a)(2).3 Kemp recovered punitive damages in a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.m The District Court found that punitive damages
recovered under § 1983 do not compensate plaintiffs for civil rights violations.23 The
court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's decision inMillerthat punitive damages constitute
a "windfall" and are outside the scope of § 104(a)(2).23
Tax Planning Implications
1. Injury to Reputation
Taxpayers have prevailed on the issue of excludability of recoveries for injury to
reputation in the Ninth Circuit in Roemrar the Sixth Circuit in Threlkeld and the Tax
Court in Miller' However, the IRS has not acquiesced in any of these decisions.
Therefore, taxpayers should consider the potential for disagreement with the IRS in
planning for the tax consequences of such recoveries. The following suggestions are
" Miller, 914 F.2d at 588 n.4.
m Id. at 591.
mo Id.
221 Id.
22 Id.
" Id. at 590.
2 Kemp v. Commissioner, 771 F. Supp. 357, 359 (S.D. Ga. 1991).
2m ld. at 358.
226 Id. at 359.
27 Id.
See Roemerv. Commissioner, 716 F2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
m See Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 E2d 81(6th Cir. 1988).
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intended to reduce the area of conflict and the likelihood of an IRS attack on recoveries
for injury to professional reputation.
First, the taxpayer should choose his remedy, if possible, under a cause of action
which has been characterized as a personal cause of actionunder state law. TheTax Court
inMiller reviewed state law to determine the nature of the cause of action and found that
the taxpayer's action for defamation was an action for personal injuries and held that the
recovery was excludable?'41
Second, the complaint should specify the nature of all claims and identify the
personal nature, where appropriate, of each. The Tax Court in Threlkeld stated that the
issue of whether the claim was on account of "personal injuries" depends on the nature
of the claim. 2 The Tax Court noted that reliance on state law alone, was not sufficient
in all cases to determine the nature of the injury.'3 This would be very important in a case
where multiple claims are presented in one cause of action.
Third, if a settlement is reached, the agreement should allocate the damage award
to the various claims. This allocation should reduce the likelihood of an IRS argument
that all damages were received on account of injury to professional reputation.
Fourth, if an action is concluded in court, the plaintiff should request that the court
or jury allocate the damage award to the various claims on which the plaintiff prevailed.
However, the plaintiff should considerthe possibility of anunfavorable allocation before
making this request. Since an IRS attack is probable, the taxpayer must choose his
strategy carefully.
2. Discrimination
Generally, victims of age, sex, or race discrimination will bring suit under the
ADEA, EPA, and/orTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act. Since all of these statutes provide
for wage-related payments, the IRS will challenge the excludability of at least a portion
of the payments." Even though taxpayers have successfully challenged the position of
the IRS in recent cases, the IRS has not retreated from its position.'
To reduce the amount of challengeable exclusions, taxpayers should consider the
following suggestions. First, the complaint filed in a discrimination suit should empha-
size causes of action which are tort or tort-type under state law. The plaintiff should
See Miller v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
' Millerv. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 E2d 586 (4th Cit. 1990).
Threlkeld v. Commissioner. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 E.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
2z Id..
I See, e.8.. United States v. Broke, 112 S. Ct. 1867(1992); Metzger v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 1013 (3rd Cir. 1988).
24 See, eg., Burke, 112 S.CL at 1867; Metzger, 845 E2d at 1013.
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present evidence in negotiations or at the trial of his or her injury and explain its relation-
ship to the tort or tort-type claims. Second, the plaintiff should allocate any settlement
recovery to the various claims and should specifically allocate as much as reasonably
possible to non-wage claims. Third, ifjudgment is awarded at the completion of a suit,
the plaintiff should ask the court to allocate the recovery between wage-related payments
and other payments. It is unlikely that the IRS will successfully challenge a court
allocation. However, the plaintiff should consider the likelihood of an unfavorable
allocation before requesting an allocation.
3. Punitive Damages
The 1989 RRA eliminated the exclusion forpunitive damages in cases not involving
physical injury or sickness. 6 In cases involving physical injury or sickness, the IRS's
position on punitive damages is clear, punitive damages are taxable even if received in
the context of a physical injury suit or settlement.2A7 Taxpayers should consider the
impact of the recent amendment to § 104(a)(2) and the IRS's position on punitive
damages before filing the complaint or negotiating a settlement in a personal injury
action. The following tax planning ideas should be considered.
First, carefully weigh the tax cost of seeking punitive damages in any action against
the potential benefits to be obtained in terms of negotiating a settlement or obtaining a
favorablejudgment. No general rules can be established in this regard since the decision
to seek punitive damages will be based upon such considerations as the type of action,
remedies available, the nature of the defendant's conduct, and the strength of the plaintiff's
position. However, the taxpayer's counsel must be aware of the tax implications of
punitive damages.
Second, any settlement agreement should specifically provide for the acceptance of
compensatory damages only. The IRS may challenge a settlement agreement which
provides solely for compensatory damages when the complaint asks for punitive dam-
ages. The IRS may apply the method of allocation described in RR 85-98 to the settle-
ment agreement u The plaintiff should be prepared to substantiate the compensatory
damages and explain the omission of punitive damages.
Third, the plaintiff may request that damages awarded by the court or jury be
specifically allocated between compensatory and punitive portions. It is unlikely that
the IRS would challenge such an allocation.
Omnibus ReconciliationAct of 1989,Pub. L.No. 101-239,§7641,103 Stat. 2379,reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(1989).
*, See, eg., Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 81; Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150(1991).
2 Rev.RuL 85-98, 1985-2C.B. 51.
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CONCLUSION
Taxpayers can take comfort in the positions of the Tax Court and the Third, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits regarding the excludability of recoveries for injury in defamation and
age discrimination suits. However, litigation with the IRS is almost assured in spite of
prior taxpayers' successes in these areas. The ruling of the Supreme Court in Burke
appears to be a narrow ruling which may have no impact onTitle VII cases broughtunder
amended-Title VII. However, it could have a significant impact in other areas ofdiscrimi-
nation. The Supreme Court held that wage-related damages recovered by Burke in the
sex discrimination suit were not excludable. This ruling seemed to rely onthe conclusion
that pre-1991 Title VII provided for no traditional tort remedies.2 9 In contrast the ADEA
provides for back pay and traditional tort remedies (i.e., compensatory and punitive
damages) for victims of age discrimination.2-
The IRS probably will continue to challenge the exclusion of back pay received in
discrimination suits. It is possible that the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to
address this issue unless Congress acts to clear this area of contention between the IRS
and taxpayers. Due to the potential for future contests with the IRS, taxpayers must give
careful consideration to remedies chosen, evidence presented, and wording of settlement
agreements.
The 1989 RRA amended § 104(a)(2) to prohibit the exclusion of punitive damages
in cases not involving physical injury or sickness.251 Despite the inconsistencies in its
position on the taxation of punitive damages and the implications of recent amendments
to § 104(a)(2), the IRS has given no indication of a willingness to change its position.
The taxpayer is best advised to plan carefully to avoid the receipt of punitive damages.
Careful planing is required to reduce the potential for conflict with the IRS in
discrimination and defamation suits. The taxpayer is well advised to consider the tax
implications of his or her claims against the defendant before a complaint is filed.
Otherwise, the taxpayer's recovery, net of txes, may be much less than originally
anticipated. The tax planning suggestions described in this article should reduce the
likelihood of an unexpected tax liability.
u See United States v. Burke, 112 S.C. 1867, 1874 (1992).
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-631 (1992).
See LR.C. § 104 (a)(2) (1992).
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